Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Lessons for the Unified Patent Court by Jacobsmeyer, Brian
Michigan Technology Law Review 
Volume 25 Article 5 
2018 
Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Lessons for the Unified Patent 
Court 
Brian Jacobsmeyer 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mtlr 
Recommended Citation 
Brian Jacobsmeyer, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Lessons for the Unified Patent Court, 25 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 131 (2018). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mtlr/vol25/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Technology Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FORUM SHOPPING IN PATENT CASES: 
LESSONS FOR THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT 
Brian Jacobsmeyer*
Despite the United Kingdom’s pending high-profile exit from the EU 
and rising Euroscepticism across the continent, the EU presses 
forward with its plans to unify patent litigation under a single court 
system. That new system—the Unified Patent Court—seeks to promote 
“uniformity of the Union legal order and the primacy of European 
Union law.” In pursuit of this goal, the UPC includes a number of 
provisions seeking to curb a rising problem facing jurisdictions across 
the globe: forum shopping in patent cases. The current European 
system and the U.S. system have seen a rise in forum shopping over the 
past couple decades, leading to increased appeals, raised litigation 
costs, reduced certainty for litigants, and the over-concentration of 
patent cases in just a few forums. This rise of forum shopping in the 
U.S. and Europe provides valuable lessons for the UPC’s proponents 
as the UPC moves toward implementation. A comparison of the UPC 
with the U.S. and European systems reveals that the UPC, in its 
present form, will likely face similar problems with forum shopping. 
But several changes to the UPC suggested in this paper will allow that 
court to better combat forum shopping.
Introduction
Despite Brexit and rising Euroscepticism, many EU member states 
seem committed to greater unification in at least one area: patent law. In 
2013, twenty-five EU member states agreed to create a unified patent court 
to hear disputes regarding already-existing European Patents and newly cre-
ated Unitary Patents, a new type of patent that grants pan-European protec-
tion for inventors.1 The 2013 Unified Patent Court (UPC) agreement consti-
tuted a firm starting point for the court’s creation, but the contracting states 
* J.D., May 2018, the University of Michigan Law School. I thank Elizabeth Pe-
terkort and Howard Bromberg for their helpful suggestions. I also thank Julie Michalski, An-
dré Rouillard and the entire Michigan Technology Law Review staff for their helpful edits.
1. Council agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. (C 175) [hereinafter: UPC 
Agreement].
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must ratify the agreement before it goes into effect.2 As of August 2018, 
most contracting states have ratified the treaty, including the UK.3
Nevertheless, ratification delays have stymied the implementation of 
the treaty. The UK, Germany and France must all ratify the treaty before it 
goes into effect.4 Among these three countries, Germany remains as the sole 
holdout. Germany’s delay is partially attributable to a German lawyer’s re-
cent constitutional challenge to Germany’s participation in the UPC.5 Pend-
ing that appeal, the German Constitutional Court has asked the German 
president to hold off on ratifying already-passed legislation to implement 
the UPC in Germany.6 The German constitutional challenge and Brexit have 
created some uncertainty regarding the future of the UPC, but many observ-
ers remain optimistic that the court will enter into force shortly.7
While the UPC has struggled in fits and starts toward implementation 
over the past few years, the United States patent system has undergone a 
number of significant developments. Perhaps most notably, Congress passed 
its first major patent reform bill in decades in 2011: the America Invents 
Act (AIA).8 The Act’s two major reforms included a transition from a “first-
to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system and the introduction of new 
post-grant administrative procedures to expedite the invalidation of improp-
erly granted patents after issuance.9 Concurrently, major Supreme Court 
cases have reshaped patent law in significant ways. Over the past few years, 
the Court has addressed a variety of patent topics including the patent-
2. See, id. at art 89.
3. European Council, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UCP), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/
?id=2013001&DocLanguage=en (last visited Oct. 21, 2018); Press Release, Unified Patent 
Court, Ratification Update (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.unified-patent-
court.org/news/ratification-update.
4. See UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 89 (requiring ratification by the three 
contracting states with the highest number of European Patents).
5. Thorsten Bausch, UPC – Finally Some News from the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court, KLUWER PATENT BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/
2017/08/16/upc-finally-some-news-from-the-german-federal-constitutional-court/.
6. Thorsten Bausch, Breaking News: Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court pulls 
Emergency Break on UPC Agreement, KLUWER PAT. BLOG (June 13, 2017), 
http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/06/13/breaking-news-germanys-federal-
constitutional-court-pulls-emergency-break-upc-agreement/.
7. Catherine Saez, EU Commission Position Paper On IP And Brexit: Trademarks, 
Designs, GIs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 12, 2017), www.ip-watch.org/2017/09/12/eu-
commission-position-paper-ip-brexit-covers-trademarks-designs-gis/; Chris de Mauny, Con-
ference Message Optimistic about UPC/UP System’s Future, BIRD & BIRD (July 4, 2018), 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2018/uk/conference-message-optimistic-about-
upc-up-systems-future.
8. JOHN VILLASENOR, BROOKINGS, THE COMPREHENSIVE PATENT REFORM OF 2011:
NAVIGATING THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT (No. 184, Sept. 2011), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_patents_villasenor.pdf.
9. Summary of the America Invents Act, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (Aug. 27, 
2018), https://www.aipla.org/detail/advocacy-article/Summary-of-the-America-Invents-Act.
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eligibility of business methods and software,10 antitrust violations in patent 
settlements,11 and proper venue in patent cases.12 These developments have 
been hugely controversial. Divides have emerged primarily between sup-
porters of stronger patent rights and those who believe overly strong patent 
rights and subsequent patent litigation have stymied innovation in the Unit-
ed States.13
Amidst these changes, one factor has shaped the fortunes of litigants 
perhaps more than any other: the availability of favorable forums. Litigants’
overwhelming preference for certain forums in patent cases reveals the ac-
tual or at least perceived importance of favorable forums. For instance, pa-
tent holders began flocking to the Eastern District of Texas in the early 
2000s as it developed a reputation as a favorable forum for plaintiffs.14 In 
recent years, that district heard roughly one third of all U.S. patent cases 
every year, but a recent Supreme Court case narrowly construing the patent 
forum venue rules may significantly reduce the number of cases heard there 
in the coming years.15
But the AIA turned the tides in favor of repeat patent defendants, giving 
them a new, more favorable forum at the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO) to counteract the effect of the Eastern District of 
Texas. Patent defendants now have the opportunity to seek a stay of in-
fringement proceedings in district court to seek invalidation of the litigated 
patent before the USPTO primarily through a process called inter partes re-
view.16 Defendants have exercised that right extensively17 and often with 
10. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
11. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
12. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
13. Compare Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially 
Viable Patents Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/, with
Joe Mullin, Supreme Court Will Weigh in on Troll-Killing Patent-Review Process,
ARSTECHNICA (June 13, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/06/supreme-court-
will-weigh-in-on-troll-killing-patent-review-process/.
14. See Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws 
Patent Cases – Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 299-300
(2011).
15. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent 
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6, (2017); see Joe 
Mullin, Many Patent-holders Stop Looking to East Texas Following Supreme Court Ruling,
ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 13, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/patent-cases-in-
east-texas-plunge-more-than-60-percent/.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012) (granting defendants the option to pursue inter partes 
review before the USPTO up to one year after being served with a patent infringement com-
plaint in district court).
17. Jim Warriner, Measuring the Success of Motions to Stay Pending IPR, LAW360
(June 6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/928654/measuring-the-success-of-motions-
to-stay-pending-ipr.
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great success: the USPTO seems more willing to invalidate patents than dis-
trict courts.18
The prevalence of forum shopping has significantly shaped the out-
comes of U.S. patent cases in recent years, perhaps more than any other fac-
tor alone. And this issue is not uniquely American: Europe has seen a simi-
lar rise in forum shopping and concentration of cases. Forty percent of all 
patent cases in Europe are heard in a single country—Germany—despite 
only 11% of European patents originating in Germany.19 The American and 
European experience with forum shopping provides several lessons for EU 
members as they seek to unify their patent system under the Unified Patent 
Court.
But why does forum shopping matter, and why should the UPC seek to 
avoid it? Perhaps most notably, the UPC explicitly aims to curb forum 
shopping by its own terms. The UPC Agreement notes that “significant var-
iations between national court systems are detrimental to innovation,” and 
the court aims to “enhance legal certainty.”20 The UPC also seeks to pro-
mote “uniformity of the Union legal order and the primacy of European Un-
ion law.”21 Thus, by its own terms, the UPC seeks to promote unified law 
and enhance legal certainty by, in part, reducing forum shopping.
Furthermore, sound policy justifies the UPC’s goal of reduced forum 
shopping. First, the primary policy justification for a patent system—
creating an incentive to invest in research and development—greatly weak-
ens if the scope of patent rights becomes uncertain or unreliable.22 And pa-
tent rights become uncertain when different courts within the same court 
system deliver different results regarding similar patents or even the same 
exact patent. Second, prolific forum shopping may lead to courts “compet-
ing” for litigants in patent cases, a frequent critique of the Eastern District of 
Texas’s practices in the United States.23 This competition may unfairly ben-
efit plaintiffs because courts may “court” plaintiffs who ultimately choose 
the venue for the dispute.24 Third, forum shopping leads to a rise in litigation 
18. Samson Vermont, IPR Statistics Revisited: Yep, It’s a Patent Killing Field,
PATENTATTORNEY.COM (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.patentattorney.com/ipr-statistics-
revisited-yep-its-a-patent-killing-field/.
19. Katrin Cremers et al., Patent Litigation in Europe, 44 EUR. J. L. ECON. 1, 26 tbl.5 
(2017); European Patent Office Annual Report 2017 on European Patent Filings, (2017), 
https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2017/statistics/patent-
filings.html#tab3 (last visited Jul. 3, 2018).
20. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at 1.
21. Id.
22. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic 
Choice Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 924-27 (2001); see also Scott Cole, The Rise 
and Fall of Patent Law Uniformity and the Need for a Congressional Response, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 713, 716–17 (2006).
23. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
631, 678–80 (2015).
24. Id.
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and appeals regarding not only the merits of the case but also procedural is-
sues such as improper venue and jurisdictional challenges.25 The availability 
of multiple forums may have its benefits as well, such as the promotion of 
legal innovation.26 Nevertheless, rising litigation costs and heightened legal 
uncertainty tend to undermine the central policy justification for a patent 
system. Thus, forum shopping should be viewed skeptically, particularly in 
patent cases.
Comparing forum shopping across jurisdictions requires consideration 
of the two necessary ingredients for forum shopping to flourish: the oppor-
tunity to forum shop and the motivation to do so. The UPC, somewhat sur-
prisingly, greatly enhances the opportunity to forum shop within the new 
system compared to the current European system. But the UPC simultane-
ously eliminates many of the motivations to forum shop. Consequently, the 
UPC as it currently stands will likely have a mixed impact on forum shop-
ping in European patent cases.
But the UPC can do better. Several changes to the UPC would decrease 
forum shopping once the EU establishes the court. These changes are in-
formed by the U.S.’s experience with forum shopping and Europeans’ expe-
rience with forum shopping under their current system. Part II of this paper 
briefly compares substantive and procedural patent law in broad strokes 
among the three relevant systems: the U.S. system, the current European 
system, and the proposed UPC. Part III analyzes how the U.S. and Europe 
have addressed both the opportunity and motivation to forum shop and 
compare the UPC’s proposed ways of addressing this issue. Part III also 
proposes several changes to the UPC that would better combat forum shop-
ping.
I.  Overview of Patent Law under U.S. Law, 
Existing European Law, and the Proposed UPC
This section will provide a brief overview of patent law principles and 
the differences among the U.S. system, the current European system, and 
the proposed UPC. First, this section provides a general overview of patent 
procurement and enforcement as it applies across most jurisdictions. Sec-
ond, this section contains a more narrow overview of some key differences 
between patent procurement and enforcement under U.S. law, current EU 
law, and the proposed UPC.
25. See Cole, supra note 22, at 717-18.
26. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Prin-
ciple, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1650–51 (2007).
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A. Obtaining and Enforcing Patents
Once granted, patents generally give the inventor the right to exclude 
others from using, making, offering to sell, selling, or importing the inven-
tion disclosed in the patent in the relevant jurisdiction.27 Notably, patents 
grant a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention, 
not a right to practice the invention.28 In fact, patentees may be prevented 
from practicing their own patented invention due to a broader patent that 
covers some aspect of their invention.29 This right to exclude is territorial: a 
U.S. patent only grants the right to exclude others from making, using, im-
porting, or selling the invention within the United States.30 Thus, inventors 
seeking patent protection in different countries need to obtain patents in 
each of those countries.
So, how do inventors obtain a patent? Generally, inventors must apply 
for a patent in the country where they seek protection through a process 
called patent prosecution. Patent prosecution generally involves a “back and 
forth” debate between the applicant and the patent office regarding whether 
the patent should be granted and how broad the issued patent can be.31
This back-and-forth debate centers around whether the applicant’s in-
vention, as disclosed in her application, is patentable. Most jurisdictions ad-
here to general principles of patentability. For instance, an invention must 
be “novel,” meaning it cannot have been disclosed to the public previously 
(subject to some exceptions).32 During prosecution, the relevant patent of-
fice will assess novelty by comparing the applicant’s invention with the pri-
or art—essentially any publicly available information potentially pertaining 
to the invention that predates the inventor’s application or date of inven-
tion.33 Patents also cannot be “obvious” extensions of the prior art and must 
have an “inventive step” to distinguish themselves from prior art.34 Also, pa-
27. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); Wolfgang Kellenter & Benedikt Migdal, Patent 
Litigation in Germany: Overview, THOMAS REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-622-3450.
28. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
29. Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Bio-
technology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 878, 878–89 (1991).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
31. See Timothy P. McAnulty, Quality Initiatives and Pilot Programs that Streamline 
Patent Prosecution at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
ASS’N (July 13, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/quality-initiatives-and-pilot-
programs-that-streamline-patent.html.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); European Patent Convention art. 54, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 255, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/e/ma1.html [here-
inafter: EPC].
33. See What is Prior Art?, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Sept. 15, 2015), 
https://www.epo.org/learning-events/materials/inventors-handbook/novelty/prior-art.html.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (describing the obviousness requirement under U.S. law); 
EPC, supra note 32, at art. 56 (describing the analogous “inventive step” requirement under 
EPC law).
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tents generally must cover “patentable subject matter” which usually ex-
cludes abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature.35 These prin-
ciples of patentability are not exhaustive, and jurisdictions approach some 
of these principles in slightly different ways. Nevertheless, the general prin-
ciples of novelty, obviousness, and patentable subject matter are key princi-
ples of patentability that span most jurisdictions. If a patentee convinces the 
relevant patent office that they have overcome these legal hurdles, the office 
will grant them a patent.
After receiving a patent, patent owners have two primary means of ex-
ercising their rights. First, patentees may choose to license their rights to 
others who wish to practice their invention, generating royalties for the pa-
tentee. Second, particularly when license negotiations fail, the patentee can 
sue an alleged infringer in court. Courts can provide a number of remedies 
to patent owners including preliminary injunctions,36 permanent injunc-
tions,37 and damages.38
Enforcement comes with risk because patent litigation involves two key 
questions: is the patent actually valid (i.e., did the patent office correctly de-
termine that the invention is patentable?), and, if so, did the defendant in-
fringe the patent? Courts, or sometimes administrative bodies,39 can find a 
patent invalid during the course of infringement litigation. Absent a success-
ful appeal, a ruling of invalidity extinguishes a patentee’s rights completely 
against any other alleged infringers.40 Thus, patent litigation can be a high-
risk, high-reward endeavor for plaintiffs.
B. Key Differences Among U.S. Law, Current European Law, 
and the Proposed UPC
Although the U.S. system, the current European system, and the pro-
posed UPC have similar rules governing patentability of inventions, there 
are several differences. In particular, several key procedural differences sig-
nificantly affect the course of patent prosecution and patent litigation under 
these three regimes.
35. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (explaining this re-
quirement under U.S. law). See also EPC, supra note 32, at art. 53 (explaining this require-
ment under EPC law).
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
37. See id.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
39. For example, anyone in the U.S. can challenge the validity of an issued patent be-
fore the USPTO in an inter partes review (IPR) hearing. IPR rulings are subject to judicial 
review by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b) (2012); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 
1920, 1929 (2015) (“Invalidity is an affirmative defense that ‘can preclude enforcement of a 
patent against otherwise infringing conduct.’ ”) (quoting 6A Chisum on Patents § 19.01, p. 
19-5 (2015)).
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Patent applicants in Europe currently have three routes to obtain patent 
rights under three respective sources of relevant law: the European Patent 
Convention, national law, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.41 First, the Eu-
ropean Patent Convention is the most significant legal framework covering 
the grant of patents in Europe. The Convention covers thirty-eight different 
countries—ten more countries than those belonging to the EU.42 The Con-
vention provides a single examination procedure for applicants to obtain 
“European Patents.”43 During this process, an inventor sends the European 
Patent Office a single application and indicates in which countries she seeks 
patent protection.44 A single office examines the patent and determines 
whether it should be granted.45 If granted, the patentee essentially receives 
separate patents for each of the indicated countries in her application, and 
each patent can be enforced separately in each of those countries.46 Each of 
those countries is required to grant these European Patents the same rights 
during an infringement proceeding as a national patent procured from their 
respective national patent offices.47 Second, inventors can seek a single pa-
tent by applying to a national patent office in the relevant country.48 Finally, 
inventors can seek protection in European countries and other countries 
(such as the United States) under a lengthy, complicated process pursuant to 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, which often overlaps or closely interacts 
with applications under the EPC.49
Patent litigation in Europe—unlike prosecution—currently remains 
within the province of each country’s respective court system with few ex-
ceptions.50 First, national courts oversee infringement and validity actions 
for all national patents. Second, national courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over the validity of European Patents issued for their respective jurisdic-
41. Kellenter & Migdal, supra note 27, at 3–4.
42. Member States of the European Patent Organization, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
https://www.epo.org/about-us/foundation/member-states.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2017); 
Countries in the EU and EEA, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea (last visited Sept. 28, 
2017).
43. European Patent Office, Guide for Applicants: How to Get a European Patent, at 
A.II. (June 2018), https://www.epo.org/applying/european/Guide-for-applicants/html/
e/index.html.
44. Id. at A.IV.
45. See id.
46. Id. at A.II.
47. EPC, supra note 32, at art. 2(2).
48. See, e.g., European Patent Office, supra note 43, at A.IV.
49. See id.
50. Patents can be challenged before the European Patent Office for a brief time after 
issuance. These proceedings only cover a limited range of issues related to patentability. After 
this time, however, validity issues must be litigated in national courts. EPC, supra note 32, at 
art. 99.
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tion.51 Consider a patentee who has a European Patent that indicates Ger-
many, the UK, and France. No court can currently litigate the validity of the 
entire “bundle of rights,” but the German courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over the validity of the German patent that issued from this bundle of rights. 
Consequently, a German court may invalidate the patent, but in the UK and 
France—even with identical language—the patent might remain in effect. 
Thus, patent litigation in Europe remains incredibly fragmented due to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of national courts over validity actions involving Eu-
ropean Patents.
The proposed UPC seeks to completely unify the European system of 
both prosecuting and litigating patents. To further unify patent prosecution, 
the UPC will create a new patent right called the “Unitary Patent.”52 These 
Unitary Patents, when granted, will give the patentee protection in all of the 
member states party to the Unified Patent Court Agreement.53 To unify the 
fragmented patent litigation system, the Unified Patent Court will immedi-
ately have exclusive jurisdiction over these Unitary Patents and, eventually, 
all European Patents as well.54 Individual national patents will still fall un-
der the jurisdiction of each member state’s own courts.55
In the United States, inventors prosecute patents before the USPTO. Pa-
tent holders can sue alleged infringers in any district court where venue and 
jurisdiction are proper.56 Since the passage of the America Invents Act, any-
one can challenge the validity of an issued patent in a number of administra-
tive, quasi-judicial proceedings before the patent office.57 Issues raised in 
these proceedings are subject to estoppel in later district court actions, limit-
ing petitioners’ ability to re-litigate validity issues after one of these admin-
istrative decisions.58 And district courts will often stay pending infringement 
actions if the defendant submits a timely petition for one of these adminis-
trative hearings.59 Meanwhile, patentees may also sue before the Interna-
tional Trade Commission to block importation of infringing goods.60 All ap-
peals of patent cases before the ITC, district courts, and the USPTO head to 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdic-
51. Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 
2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, art. 24(4), 2012 O..J. (L 351) 1, 18 [hereinafter Brussels I].
52. See Regulation 1257/2012, of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 Dec. 
2012 on Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent 
Protection, art. 19, 25, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 1, 3–4.
53. Id. at art. 5.
54. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 3.
55. Id. at art. 31(2).
56. See 28 U.S.C. §1400(b) (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
57. See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N supra note 9; Trials, USPTO (Sept. 6, 2018, 2:18 
PM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials.
58. See 35 U.S.C. §315(e) (2012).
59. See Warriner, supra note 17.
60. See 19 U.S.C. §1337 (2012).
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tion over these matters.61 Thus, the U.S. has a unified patent prosecution 
system but a diverse and somewhat fragmented set of courts and administra-
tive bodies that oversee patent disputes.
On a broad level, the three systems are quite similar. Regarding prose-
cution, the current European system and the U.S. system have similar pro-
cesses, but European applicants have slightly more territorial options (e.g., 
pursuing national patents or a European Patent). The UPC would add one 
more option—the Unitary Patent that has effect in all member states. On the 
litigation side, notable differences exist. U.S. litigation occurs in federal dis-
trict courts, the USPTO, the ITC, and the Federal Circuit. In Europe, how-
ever, all litigation currently happens in the various national courts of coun-
tries with no single unifying court of appeals. The UPC aims to unify 
European patent litigation into a single court system. The remainder of this 
paper will address how well the proposed UPC will unify European patent 
litigation and achieve one of its stated aims of limiting forum shopping.
The chart below illustrates the aforementioned key similarities and dif-
ferences between these three systems.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012).
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System: U.S. System Current European 
System
Proposed 
UPC System
Types of patents 
available
U.S. utility patents 
issued by the USPTO.
European Patents: 
A “bundle of 
national patents” 
enforceable in the 
designated 
countries. Issued by 
the EPO.
National Patents:
A patent only 
enforceable in a 
single country. 
Issued by the 
individual country’s 
patent office.
European Patents:
Prosecution process 
will remain largely 
unchanged.
National Patents: The 
UPC will not change 
National Patents.
Unitary Patent: A 
new type of patent 
with unitary effect 
across all member 
states of the UPC.
Forums for 
litigation
1. U.S. district courts
oversee patent 
infringement suits. 
2. The International 
Trade Commission
addresses infringement 
suits for imported 
goods. 
3. Under the America 
Invents Act, the 
USPTO oversees 
several invalidation 
proceedings that may be 
concurrent with pending 
district court litigation.
1. National courts
generally oversee 
litigation over 
European Patents 
and National 
Patents issued in 
that country.
2. The EPO
conducts 
invalidation 
hearings for a short 
time after European 
Patents are issued.
1. National courts 
will still oversee 
litigation concerning 
National Patents. They 
will also have 
jurisdiction over 
European Patents 
temporarily during a 
transition period.
2. The EPO will still 
conduct invalidation 
hearings during the 
transition period.
3. The new Unified 
Patent Court will 
have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the 
new Unitary Patent. 
The UPC will also 
have exclusive 
jurisdiction over 
European Patents after 
a transition period. 
Appeals All patent-related 
appeals head to the 
Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit
and, rarely, the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
Appeals generally 
ascend within each 
national court 
system. 
Appeals will be heard 
before a single court of 
appeal that is part of 
the Unified Patent 
Court.
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II.  Forum Shopping: Opportunity and 
Motivation under the Three Systems 
Forum shopping proliferates when litigants have the requisite oppor-
tunity and motivation. Plaintiffs (and sometimes defendants) need courts to 
exercise permissive jurisdictional rules, creating an opportunity to forum 
shop. Litigants must also expect a different outcome (either on the merits or 
procedurally) across the available jurisdictions—creating a motivation to 
forum shop. With a strong opportunity and motivation to forum shop, liti-
gants will exercise their options to their own advantage.
First, opportunity to forum shop flows from the jurisdiction and venue 
rules within a legal system. Jurisdiction and venue may be limited by a sov-
ereign’s constitution, treaties, statutes, or case law. Second, three core in-
centives appear to drive litigants’ motivation to forum shop in patent cases: 
(1) different applications of substantive law; (2) different applications of 
procedural law; and (3) variability in the expertise of a particular court.
The current U.S. and European systems address the opportunity and 
motivation to forum shop in different ways, leading to varying levels of fo-
rum shopping in each jurisdiction. These different results provide a guide to 
how well the proposed UPC will address forum shopping and where it 
might improve.
A. Opportunity to Forum Shop: Rules for Venue and Jurisdiction
Litigants cannot forum shop if their chosen forum lacks jurisdiction or 
is an improper venue for the case. Thus, venue and jurisdictional rules are 
the chief obstacle to forum shopping. Permissive rules make forum shop-
ping easier; strict rules make forum shopping harder.
1. The U.S. System
In the U.S., plaintiffs generally may sue defendants in a court that has 
general personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the case.62 Courts located in a particular state—whether they are 
federal or state courts—have general personal jurisdiction over legal per-
sons domiciled there.63 And companies are domiciled in a state if they are 
incorporated in that state, have a principal place of business in that state, or 
are “at home” in that state.64 General jurisdiction in the U.S. under the 
aforementioned principles, particularly after the 2014 decision in Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, is quite limited, however. In that case, the Court seemed to 
62. All U.S. district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) (2012).
63. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
64. Id.
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significantly narrow the “at home” prong of general jurisdiction.65 As a con-
sequence, plaintiffs have few options when suing under theories of general 
jurisdiction and can primarily only sue where corporations are headquar-
tered or incorporated.66
But plaintiffs have much greater forum shopping opportunities under 
theories of specific jurisdiction. As the U.S. has crafted its due process limi-
tations on specific jurisdiction over the past half-century, the opportunity to 
forum shop in patent cases has exploded. To confer specific jurisdiction in a 
patent case, the federal court must first determine whether jurisdiction falls 
within the long-arm statute of the state where the court sits.67 Many of these 
long-arm statutes, however, assert jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowable 
under the Constitution. Thus, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments—and corresponding “minimum contacts” case law—
are generally the primary weapon defendants can use to defeat jurisdictional 
claims.68
This weapon is quite weak in patent cases, however. Under Supreme 
Court caselaw, a defendant’s single contact with a forum can be sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction if (1) the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the 
forum, (2) the contact is sufficiently related to the plaintiff’s claim, and (3) 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be “reasonable.”69 In patent cases, a single 
act of alleged direct infringement, such as a single sale in the forum or ap-
pearance at trade shows, typically confers jurisdiction.70 Moreover, under 
the “stream of commerce” doctrine, manufacturers typically fall within the 
jurisdiction of the downstream forum where the products are sold, even if 
the manufacturer did not directly sell products in that forum.71 Consequent-
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. FED R. CIV. P. 4(K)(1)(A).
68. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing the “mini-
mum contacts” jurisprudence for specific jurisdiction that has evolved over the past seventy 
years).
69. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (elucidating the “purposeful avail-
ment” requirement); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (allowing juris-
diction where the defendant had a single contact with the forum state); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987) (elucidating the “fairness factors” relevant 
to whether an assertion of jurisdiction is “reasonable”).
70. See Patent Rights Prot. Grp., LLC v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 603 F.3d 1364, 
1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (vacating district court’s finding of no jurisdiction and suggesting 
that use of an allegedly infringing device at a trade show by out-of-state defendants may be 
enough to confer jurisdiction); Nathaniel Bruno, Assessing Personal Jurisdiction in Patent 
Litigation Actions, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECH. L. J. Nov. 2007 at 10-15, 
https://www.sheppardmullin.com/media/article/464_Assessing%20Personal%20Jurisdiction%
20in%20Patent%20Litigation%20Actions%20_Bruno_.pdf.
71. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564-65
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (conferring jurisdiction in a patent case under the Supreme Court’s “stream of 
commerce” jurisprudence).
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ly, jurisdiction generally exists where an act of alleged infringement oc-
curred either directly or indirectly.
In the 2017 TC Heartland case, however, the Supreme Court curbed pa-
tent plaintiffs’ opportunity to forum shop not on jurisdictional grounds but 
on venue grounds. Since the late 1980s, the Federal Circuit had interpreted 
the federal venue statute for patent cases as a complement to the venue stat-
ute for other cases.72 Consequently, venue was proper wherever personal ju-
risdiction existed, and generally improper venue issues were not litigated. 
TC Heartland changed these notions of proper venue when the Supreme 
Court held that the patent venue statute stands on its own.73 As a conse-
quence, venue in patent cases now requires (1) acts of infringement and (2) 
“a regular and established place of business.”74 What constitutes a “regular 
and established place of business” has been heavily litigated in the short 
time since the case was decided. The Federal Circuit has already provided 
some guidance, most critically that venue requires a physical presence in the 
forum.75 Surely, the Federal Circuit will further refine this test with the low-
er courts over the coming years. But the message is clear. Forum shopping 
has been problematic—particularly in the Eastern District of Texas—and 
the higher courts are seeking to curtail forum shopping primarily in that dis-
trict.
In short, the U.S.’s jurisdictional rules are quite permissive in patent 
cases. Thus, over the past few decades, forum shopping has flourished. TC 
Heartland seeks to curb this development. As a consequence, many U.S. 
patent plaintiffs now have fewer forum choices, but TC Heartland’s full ef-
fects on forum shopping remain to be seen.
2. The Current European System
At first blush, the EU has a similarly permissive view of jurisdiction. 
Like in the U.S., plaintiffs can sue EU persons and legal entities at their 
place of domicile under theories of general jurisdiction.76 EU companies 
have domiciles at their place of incorporation, their seat, and their principal 
place of business.77 Plaintiffs may also sue under permissive views of spe-
cific jurisdiction. In tort cases—which also encompass patent infringement 
cases for jurisdictional purposes—plaintiffs may sue at the “place where the 
72. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 
1990).
73. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017).
74. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
75. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017), transferred sub nom. Ray-
theon Co. v. Cray, Inc., No. 18-cv-318-wmc, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92922 (W.D. Wis. June 
1, 2018).
76. See Brussels I, supra note 51, at art. 63(1).
77. Id.
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harmful event occurred or may occur.”78 Selling an allegedly infringing 
product in a jurisdiction should generally be sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
in the EU.79 Thus, on its face, EU law takes an equally permissive view of 
jurisdiction compared to the U.S. and consequently creates a wide oppor-
tunity for forum shopping.
Nevertheless, two fairly strong limiting principles curb forum shopping 
in European patent cases: the Shevill doctrine and the territoriality of inva-
lidity proceedings for European Patents. First, the Shevill case established a 
damages rule that limits the feasibility of forum shopping. Under that case’s
doctrine, defendants may only collect damages accruing in a specific coun-
try when suing a defendant in that country based on specific jurisdiction 
(i.e., the place of alleged infringement).80 To collect all damages in a single 
case, plaintiffs must sue the defendant at its domicile.81 Thus, plaintiffs have 
less incentive to forum shop: they can either sue at the defendant’s domicile 
for a consolidated case or litigate numerous essentially identical cases
across all of Europe. Second, when defendants raise an invalidity defense, 
the country where the patent was issued immediately gets exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the invalidity issue.82 This principle generally places the original 
infringement proceeding on hold until the issuing jurisdiction resolves the 
validity issue.83
But patent litigants have identified two key loopholes to these doctrines 
that allow for forum shopping. First, preliminary injunctions (made by 
plaintiffs/patentees) are not subject to the Shevill doctrine, which only co-
vers damages.84 Preliminary injunction actions also escape the exclusive in-
validity jurisdiction rule because they are considered a “pre-merits” chal-
lenge.85 Second, declarations of non-infringement do not run afoul of the 
invalidity jurisdiction rule because the plaintiffs in those cases are the mas-
ter of their own case. Plaintiffs in these cases, who are typically would-be 
defendants seeking a declaratory judgment that they are not infringing a 
competitor, can simply choose not to challenge the validity of the patent in 
question and keep the case in their selected forum. So, these two powerful 
remedies remain ripe for forum shopping, and an evaluation of how litigants 
have exploited these remedies is more thoroughly explored later in this pa-
per.86 Litigants have a wide opportunity to forum shop under the current Eu-
78. Id. at art. 7(2).
79. See Ralph Minderop et al., Cross-Border Patent Litigation in Europe: Change Is 
Coming, IAM MAGAZINE (June 17, 2015), https://www.iam-media.com/cross-border-patent-
litigation-europe-change-coming.
80. Case C-68/93, Shevill v. Presse All. SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-415, ¶ 33.
81. Id.
82. Minderop et al., supra note 79.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See infra Section III.B.ii.2.
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ropean system, but the Shevill doctrine and the territoriality of invalidity 
proceedings somewhat limit the feasibility of forum shopping.
3. The UPC and Suggested Changes
In many ways, the UPC’s proposed structure greatly expands litigants’
opportunity to forum shop. The UPC will have three types of courts: local 
divisions, regional divisions, and the central division. All member states 
which desire a local division can establish one under the UPC.87 Member 
states with fewer patent cases may choose to join a neighboring member 
state and create a “regional division” with competence across both member 
states.88 Finally, a central division will hear cases when no local division is 
available and under certain circumstances that allow transfer to the central 
division, such as when a plaintiff brings a case before a regional division 
and seeks damages across more than three countries.89
The UPC retains the traditionally permissive view of jurisdiction that 
allows plaintiffs to file in the local or regional division of any member state 
where infringement occurred or “may occur.”90 And four policies in the 
proposed UPC either expand the opportunity to forum shop even further or 
largely retain the current, permissive rules: the UPC (1) greatly diminishes 
the Shevill doctrine for damages in patent infringement cases; (2) continues 
to allow general jurisdiction over one defendant to confer jurisdiction over 
all defendants; (3) allows lower courts to invalidate all designations of Eu-
ropean patents, even designations outside of the forum’s country; and (4) 
grants lower courts pan-European injunctive power.
First, the UPC greatly diminishes the Shevill doctrine for damages. Un-
der that doctrine, current European courts can only grant damages for in-
fringement that occurred within their host member state.91 But the UPC al-
lows a single local division to grant damages across multiple member states 
for European patents.92 The UPC has one limiting factor: a defendant sued 
in a regional division can request transfer to the central division if infringe-
ment occurred in three or more regional divisions.93 Inexplicably, the UPC 
appears to provide no such rule for local divisions, and it is possible that 
member states may choose to only set up local divisions, rendering this pro-
vision moot. Thus, the UPC punches a huge hole in the Shevill doctrine.
Second, the UPC allows general jurisdiction over one defendant to con-
fer specific jurisdiction over all other defendants who have a “commercial 
relationship” with the first defendant and were involved in the “same in-
87. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 7.3.
88. Id. at arts. 7(5) and 33(2).
89. Id. at art. 33(1)(b)-33(2).
90. Id. at art. 33(1)(a).
91. Case C-68/93, Shevill v. Presse All. SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-00415, ¶ 33.
92. See UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 34.
93. Id. at art. 33(2).
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fringement” as the first defendant.94 Even the U.S.’s permissive personal ju-
risdictional rules require separate analyses for each individual defendant.95
Moreover, the UPC’s conflation of general and specific jurisdiction will 
create ripe opportunities for forum shopping that will not make sense. Imag-
ine a wholesaler incorporated in Greece but with a principal place of busi-
ness in Germany. Now imagine that a British manufacturer sold the whole-
saler allegedly infringing goods that the wholesaler later sold downstream to 
a retailer who only operates in France. Under the UPC, a plaintiff patentee 
can sue the British manufacturer and French retailer in Greece even if they 
have zero unilateral contacts with Greece. Their only fault was to do busi-
ness with a company that happened to incorporate in Greece (but does not 
operate in Greece). This jurisdictional rule aims to consolidate cases and 
promote judicial efficiency. But it does so at the expense of fairness and 
reason in some cases.
Third, after a transitional period, local UPC divisions will have the 
power to invalidate all designations of a European patent.96 Currently, plain-
tiffs may only seek a declaration of invalidity one country at a time.97 But 
granting plaintiffs the ability to extinguish the entire “bundle of rights” in a 
single forum will create a huge opportunity to seek favorable local divi-
sions.
Finally, also after a transitional period, local UPC divisions can grant 
pan-European preliminary and permanent injunctions against alleged in-
fringers. Most national courts in Europe today refuse to do that. The higher 
EU courts have curtailed the Dutch courts’ ability to grant pan-European 
injunctions over the past few years.98 The UPC, by design, grants broad 
power to the local divisions and, as a consequence, creates the opportunity 
to forum shop for powerful remedies.
To combat the opportunity to forum shop, the UPC’s drafters should 
consider (1) retaining the heart of the Shevill doctrine, (2) eliminating the 
jurisdictional “hook” that captures co-defendants who share “commercial 
relationships,” and (3) limiting the power of local divisions to issue pan-
European injunctions.
First, the UPC’s gutting of the Shevill doctrine allows for widespread 
forum shopping within the UPC system, and a single local division can 
grant pan-European money damages. The Shevill doctrine curbs forum 
94. Id. at art. 33(1)(b).
95. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
96. See UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 34.
97. Minderop et al., supra note 79.
98. Id.
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shopping in most other cases before EU courts, and patent law likely justi-
fies even stricter controls on the opportunity to forum shop.99
Second, the EU rule that allows jurisdiction over one defendant to 
“stand in” for a co-defendant as long as the defendants share a commercial 
relationship also unnecessarily promotes the opportunity to forum shop. 
Although the UPC did not create this rule, its drafters should consider 
amending it to create stronger protections for defendants with limited con-
nections to forum courts.
Third, allowing local divisions to issue pan-European preliminary in-
junctions and permanent injunctions will create a huge opportunity to shop 
for favorable courts which readily issue these remedies. Although improper 
injunctions may be addressable on appeal, these remedies can inflict mas-
sive damage even if issued for a short period of time. For instance, prelimi-
narily enjoining a competitor from making an allegedly infringing product 
could cripple that competitor even if it is later vindicated on the merits. 
Thus, the UPC’s drafters should constrain the court system’s jurisdictional 
rules in the aforementioned ways to limit the opportunity to forum shop.
As demonstrated, the UPC has greatly widened the opportunity for 
plaintiffs to forum shop. Plaintiffs will no longer face the shackles of territo-
rial invalidity proceedings, the Shevill doctrine, or territorial injunctive 
power. Moreover, plaintiffs will continue to enjoy permissive rules on per-
sonal jurisdiction and expansive jurisdiction in cases of multiple defendants. 
But these provisions do not guarantee that forum shopping will occur. Alt-
hough these provisions grant litigants more forum choices, one question re-
mains: will they exercise that choice?
B. Motivation to Forum Shop
Under both the United States and European systems, two jurisdictions 
have emerged as the dominant patent forums within those systems. In the 
United States, the Eastern District of Texas reigns supreme, hearing more 
than a third of all patent suits in the United States (with one judge hearing a 
quarter of all patent cases).100 In Europe, Germany dominates, hearing 
roughly two-thirds of all patent cases in Europe.101
What explains plaintiffs’ overwhelming preference for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas and Germany, respectively? A number of factors likely ex-
plain litigants’ strong motivation to shop for these two fora: (1) the courts’
99. See supra Section I, at 5–6 (“First, the primary policy justification for a patent sys-
tem—creating an incentive to invest in research and development—greatly weakens if the 
scope of patent rights becomes uncertain or unreliable”).
100. Love & Yoon, supra note 15, at 6.
101. Cremers et al., supra note 19, at 26; Matthew Bultman, What You Need to Know 
About Patent Litigation in Germany, LAW360 (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1067438/what-you-need-to-know-about-patent-litigation-in-
germany.
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application of substantive patent law; (2) the procedural rules of the two ju-
risdictions, including the availability of juries; and (3) the expertise of judg-
es and existence of systematic rules for patent cases in each jurisdiction. 
And these three motivations to forum shop vary under the United States sys-
tem, the current European system, and the proposed UPC.
1. Differences in Substantive Law
Substantive patent law generally addresses the rules for invalidity and 
infringement, and substantive differences in these laws create a strong in-
centive for forum shopping. For instance, expansive definitions of infringe-
ment will invite plaintiffs seeking an easy avenue to prove infringement. Al-
ternatively, a forum with strict validity rules may deter plaintiffs worried 
about invalidation of their patents. All three systems allow for some vari-
ance in the application of substantive patent law, and the Unified Patent 
Court slightly unifies substantive patent law in Europe—particularly the law 
concerning infringement.
a. The U.S. System
In the U.S. system, fairly-detailed national statutes govern substantive 
patent law but courts still have room to apply different interpretations of 
substantive patent law. These statutes detail the requirements for patent va-
lidity,102 infringement,103 and remedies.104 All courts (and administrative bod-
ies such as the USPTO) must apply these statutes to patent cases. But statu-
tory ambiguity inevitably leads to different interpretations across the district 
courts until the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court resolves these discrepan-
cies.105 Sometimes, the Federal Circuit will refuse to address these district-
splits, leading to uncertainty over the law unless the Supreme Court grants a 
petition for certiorari.106 Thus, in practice, substantive patent law often does 
vary within the U.S. district court system, and district-splits sometimes re-
main unresolved for years.107
There are also substantive differences between district courts and the 
USPTO’s primary internal procedure for invalidating patents, inter partes 
reviews. Perhaps most critically, the USPTO applies a different substantive 
standard to the interpretation of patent claims—the “broadest reasonable in-
102. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012).
103. See, e.g., id. § 271.
104. See, e.g., id. § 283–284.
105. See, e.g., Charles R. Manedo & Sandra Hudak, SCOTUS Asked to Resolve Splits in 
Patent-Eligibility Analysis in Context of Video-on-Demand Technology, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 
19, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/19/scotus-asked-resolve-splits-patent-
eligibility-analysis/id=82212/.
106. See id.
107. Id. (noting that one such district-split arose after a 2014 Supreme Court ruling and 
remains unresolved in 2017).
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terpretation” instead of the “plain and ordinary meaning” interpretation ap-
plied in district courts.108 This more expansive interpretation of patent 
claims makes invalidation more likely because broader claims are more 
likely to be anticipated by prior art. And litigants see this difference as more 
than semantic: an appeal on this issue made it to the Supreme Court.109 The 
Supreme Court upheld the USPTO’s differing standard, finding that the 
USPTO rule was within their authority under the office’s authorizing stat-
ute.110
Therefore, varying substantive law (1) among the district courts and (2) 
between the USPTO and the district court system have created incentives 
for forum shopping in the U.S. Some of this forum shopping was built into 
the system: Congress wanted to encourage the use of newly-created inter 
partes reviews as an administrative alternative to district court litigation. 
But Congress may not have intended the wide-scale adoption of inter partes
reviews as a go-to strategy in so many patent lawsuits. Moreover, while var-
iance among the district courts may be somewhat inevitable, it remains un-
desirable because it increases unpredictability, raises litigation costs over 
jurisdictional/forum issues, and can “unfairly” favor one class of litigants 
contrary to the policy goals of the patent regime.
b. The Current European System
The current European System allows for a similar amount of variation 
pertaining to substantive patent validity law and an even greater variation 
regarding substantive patent infringement law. The European Patent Con-
vention and regulations promulgated pursuant to that Convention provide 
detailed requirements for patent validity that are binding on all national 
courts overseeing a dispute over a European Patent.111 The national law of 
the forum fills in the gaps.112 Because most member states of the EPC are 
civil law countries, the statutory system under the EPC tends to provide 
similarly detailed guidance to courts compared to the United States. This 
fairly specific statutory system, in theory, should lead to limited discrepan-
cies in the application of law across the member states.
But a countervailing force can lead to different interpretations across 
different courts even within a single European country—the lack of a strict 
adherence to stare decisis.113 Courts in a single civil law country generally 
are not bound to a higher court’s interpretation in future cases, but fairly 
uniform precedent can create significant persuasive authority for these low-
108. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2146.
111. See EPC, supra note 32, at art. 2(2), art. 52–74.
112. See id. at art. 74.
113. See generally Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Sys-
tems: A Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006).
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er courts.114 So, despite the binding effect of the European Patent Conven-
tion’s rules on patent validity, dozens of national law systems fill in the 
gaps, and the lack of stare decisis allows for greater disparities among 
courts even within a single country. Even more importantly, no unifying law 
covers patent infringement across the member states. Thus, substantive law 
for validity seems to vary at roughly the same levels as it does in the United 
States, but substantive law for infringement might vary even more within 
Europe due to the lack of a unifying code.
Some limited empirical evidence has revealed incongruous decisions 
regarding the same patent across multiple European jurisdictions, suggest-
ing a variation in the application of substantive patent law.115 Courts in mul-
tiple jurisdictions can explicitly and implicitly apply different substantive 
patent law even to validity issues covered by the EPC. National law still fills
in the gaps, and different courts will interpret the EPC differently. Thus, the 
EPC, by its own terms and in practice, allows for variable application of 
substantive patent law across the member states.
c.  The UPC and Suggested Changes
The Unified Patent Court would create a slightly more unified substan-
tive law for patent infringement, but it is primarily concerned with proce-
dural changes. Under the UPC, courts will still draw from a number of 
sources for substantive patent law including EU regulations, the EPC, and 
national law.116 Nevertheless, the UPC itself does introduce a few unifying 
changes to the substantive law of infringement and validity. Concerning in-
fringement, the UPC provides unifying definitions of infringement and vari-
ous infringement immunities.117 But these definitions are necessarily broad, 
and their application in the UPC’s courts will guide the outcomes of future 
cases. Also, the EPC, EU regulations, and national law will continue to dic-
tate the “substantive law” in patent cases for both infringement and invalidi-
ty.118
So how does the UPC address the motivation to seek favorable substan-
tive law? The UPC appears to slightly unify the substantive law of in-
fringement with some uniformly applicable provisions. Invalidity remains 
largely unchanged, but the substantive law for invalidity applied across Eu-
ropean national courts is already largely uniform under the EPC, even 
though national courts can only invalidate the part of a European Patent that 
designates their country. Thus, the UPC might resolve some of the substan-
114. Id.
115. Malwina Mejer & Bruno van Pottelsberghe, Economic Incongruities in the Europe-
an Patent System, 34 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 215, 224–32 (2012).
116. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 24.
117. Id. at art. 25–26.
118. Id. at art. 24.
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tive law differences pertaining to infringement, but it does little else to fur-
ther unify substantive patent law in Europe.
Although substantive law differences will promote the motivation to fo-
rum shop, the UPC drafters should allow the UPC’s appellate court to carve 
out the nuances of substantive infringement law. Substantive infringement 
issues include the standards for infringement, available remedies, and inter-
pretive standards/tools (e.g., for claim construction). In the U.S. system, for 
instance, these nuances of substantive infringement law are frequently re-
tooled in a central court—typically the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit and, sometimes, the Supreme Court. Careful statutory pre-
scriptions for these types of rules generally do not work partly because the 
rules often depend on the type of technology at issue. Thus, caselaw should 
determine these rules, and the UPC’s drafters should not intervene to further 
unify this law, particularly at this early stage of the court’s existence.
2. Differences in Non-Jurisdictional Procedural Law
Aside from jurisdictional rules and variable substantive law, procedural 
rules can strongly influence litigants’ choice of forum. Courts’ varying bur-
dens of proof, different discovery schedules, and differing willingness to 
grant certain remedies all create significant incentives to forum shop.
a.  The U.S. System
Differences in procedural law likely provide the greatest motivation to 
forum shop within the U.S. system. There are two sets of differences worth 
exploring: (1) the differences among the U.S. district courts and (2) the dif-
ferences between district courts and the USPTO’s quasi-judicial proceed-
ings.
First, although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure uniformly bind all 
U.S. district courts, gap-filling local rules, high levels of deference to many 
lower court decisions, and variations in district jury pools create a system 
with variable procedural law. A number of district courts, including those in 
the Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District of California, have 
created their own local rules that specify timetables for patent cases. These 
rules likely attract plaintiffs and defendants seeking higher predictability re-
garding issues including waiver, scheduling, and required disclosures.119 Al-
so, many procedural decisions including those for briefing schedules, the 
scope of discovery orders, and the scope of summary judgment motions are 
only reviewable under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard. Fi-
nally, perhaps the most unpredictable aspect of patent litigation is uniquely 
American: jury trials. Patentees often seek jury trials in patent cases. Many 
commenters attribute the “plaintiff-friendly” jury pool in the Eastern Dis-
119. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Pat. L.R. 2-1, 3-1, 3-3.
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trict of Texas and the jury pool’s predilection to hand out huge damage 
awards to the District’s rise as the most popular destination for patent plain-
tiffs.120 Other commentators doubt this “East Texas jury” theory to explain 
the District’s popularity.121 Nevertheless, repeat patent defendants have 
shamelessly attempted to sway the jury pool in East Texas; in fact, Samsung 
paid to build an ice rink in Marshall, Texas to allegedly curry favor with po-
tential jurors.122 Thus, among the U.S. district courts, variations in local 
rules, particular judges’ procedural decisions, and jury pools all create in-
centives to bring suits in particular districts.
In addition to the variances among the district courts, the district courts 
as a whole differ procedurally from invalidity proceedings before the
USPTO in several key areas, creating significant incentives for defendants
to “forum shop.” Defendants may seek a stay of district court proceedings 
and institute an inter partes review proceeding before the USPTO to invali-
date the litigated patent.123 And many district courts will grant that request in 
most cases.124 So, why move the litigation to the patent office? First, the 
USPTO has significantly more limited discovery: a particularly attractive 
quality for budget-conscious defendants seeking to cheaply invalidate the 
plaintiff’s patent.125 Second, the USPTO requires a lowered burden of proof 
to invalidate patents, creating yet another incentive for defendants to seek an 
inter partes review.126 Thus, more limited discovery and a defendant-
friendly burden of proof have motivated defendants to transfer litigation 
from district courts to the USPTO.
120. See, e.g., Julie Blackman et al., East Texas Jurors and Patent Litigation, THE JURY 
EXPERT (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2010/03/east-texas-jurors-and-patent-
litigation/.
121. See, e.g., Iancu & Chung, supra note 14, at 299–300.
122. See Bruce Berman, For Samsung Charity Begins at “Home,” Marshall, Texas, IP
CLOSEUP (Feb. 25, 2015), https://ipcloseup.com/2015/02/25/for-samsung-charity-begins-at-
home-marshall-texas/.
123. Within one year from the commencement of a district court action, defendants may 
seek a stay and institute an inter partes review of the disputed patent’s validity before the 
USPTO. Courts generally grant stays for IPRs, and estoppel provisions prevent re-litigation of 
the validity issue once the case returns to district court. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)-(b); (e) (2012); 
Samson Vermont, IPR Statistics Revisited: Yep, It’s a Patent Killing Field,
PATENTATTORNEY.COM (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.patentattorney.com/ipr-statistics-
revisited-yep-its-a-patent-killing-field/.
124. Warriner, supra note 17; Samson Vermont, IPR Statistics Revisited: Yep, It’s a Pa-
tent Killing Field, PATENTATTORNEY.COM (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://www.patentattorney.com/ipr-statistics-revisited-yep-its-a-patent-killing-field/.
125. See Michael J. Flibbert & Maureen D. Queler, 5 Distinctions Between IPRs and 
District Court Patent Litigation, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETTT & DUNNER,
LLP (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/5-distinctions-between-iprs-and-
district-court-patent-litigation.html.
126. See id. Some might characterize the different standards of proof as a “substantive” 
difference rather than a “procedural” difference. Regardless, the difference appears to matter 
to litigants.
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In effect, the introduction of inter partes reviews and other post-grant 
proceedings has pushed the U.S. toward a bifurcated system (like the cur-
rent German system) for resolving invalidity and infringement issues. Dis-
trict courts (and to a lesser extent, the ITC) remain the sole arbiters of patent 
infringement at the trial level. And district courts retain exclusive jurisdic-
tion over some invalidity issues outside the scope of the USPTO’s inter 
partes review procedures.127 But district courts have increasingly deferred 
the key invalidity issues arising in most cases—anticipation and obvious-
ness—to the inter partes review process.128 Thus, the USPTO increasingly 
decides invalidity issues while district courts still decide infringement is-
sues, assuming the USPTO’s invalidation of the patent has not rendered in-
fringement moot.
b. The Current European System
The current European system has even wider variance of procedural law 
across different countries. Understandably, procedural law varies signifi-
cantly among court systems in countries with different languages, legal cul-
tures, and history. These procedural differences can make huge differences 
to litigants even well before the merits of a case are addressed. In particular, 
procedural differences have given rise to two notable forum shopping phe-
nomena in Europe: preliminary injunction relief in the Netherlands and dec-
larations of non-infringement in Italy.
First, the Dutch courts have historically been much more willing to 
grant cross-border injunctions, creating a significant incentive to forum 
shop.129 For instance, consider a European patent that designates the Nether-
lands, Germany, and France. Historically, Dutch courts were willing to issue 
injunctions enforceable in all three countries after hearing cases solely on 
infringement of the Netherlands part of the European patent.130 Moreover, 
Dutch courts would issue cross-border injunctions on defendants who did 
not even infringe the Dutch version of the European patent if they were suf-
ficiently connected to a defendant who had committed such infringement.131
Several European Court of Justice cases significantly narrowed Dutch 
courts’ ability to issue cross-border injunctions, but the Court explicitly left 
127. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
128. Warriner, supra note 17; USPTO Panels can only invalidate patents on grounds of 
anticipation or obviousness during inter partes review. District courts usually stay proceedings 
when an IPR is pending, suggesting a deference to the USPTO. Samson Vermont, IPR Statis-
tics Revisited: Yep, It’s a Patent Killing Field, PATENTATTORNEY.COM (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://www.patentattorney.com/ipr-statistics-revisited-yep-its-a-patent-killing-field/; Inter 
Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-
decisions/trials/inter-partes-review.
129. See Minderop et al., supra note 79.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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the door open for preliminary injunctions due to their pre-merits nature.132
Consequently, there remains an incentive to seek cross-border preliminary 
injunctions in the Netherlands, but other economic concerns may dissuade 
plaintiffs from filing in that country.133
Second, differences in Italian procedural law have motivated would-be 
defendants to preemptively file declarations of non-infringement in Italy—a
phenomenon known as the “Italian torpedo.”134 Italian courts have taken an 
expansive view of EU jurisdiction rules, extending their jurisdiction for 
non-infringement declaratory judgment actions even to foreign versions of 
European Patents that also indicate Italy.135 Other EU courts (such as a 
German court) must decline hearing substantially similar cases if a party 
filed elsewhere first.136 Moreover, Italian courts notoriously take a long time 
to resolve cases, leading to protracted litigation while the patentee remains 
unable to sue for infringement.137 Thus, would-be defendants can “torpedo”
a patentee’s potential case if they file in Italy before the patentee sues for 
infringement.
Thus procedural law and procedural outcomes vary significantly in the 
current European climate. These differences have created a huge incentive 
to forum shop, giving rise to two popular jurisdictions that grant uncom-
monly generous remedies to certain classes of litigants.
c.  The UPC and Suggested Changes
Unified procedural law is the driving motivation and aim of the pro-
posed UPC, and if the court successfully achieves that aim it will likely 
greatly reduce this motivation to forum shop. The UPC’s currently proposed 
structure includes several provisions that will further unify procedural law. 
But other structures will either do little to constrain this motivation to forum 
shop or even exacerbate the problems within the current European system.
Compared to the current European system, the UPC’s combination of a 
unified court hierarchy, a single appeals court, and elimination of “torpedo”
declaratory judgments will likely reduce the incentive to forum shop. Under 
the current European system, appeals travel within each country’s court sys-
tem, sometimes leading to conflicting decisions on invalidity for designa-
132. Id.
133. See id. (noting that two percent of European patent cases are filed in the Nether-
lands).
134. Gabriel Cuonzo, The “Italian Torpedo” Never Ending Saga, KLUWER PATENT 
BLOG (Sept. 2, 2013), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2013/09/02/the-italian-torpedo-
never-ending-saga/.
135. See id.
136. Id.; Brussels I, supra note 51, at art. 21.
137. Cuonzo, supra note 134; Riccardo Perotti, A Requiem for Torpedo Actions? A Cat-
alogue of the Most Recent Decisions on the Issue, IPLENS (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://iplens.org/2017/09/04/a-requiem-for-torpedo-actionsa-catalogue-of-the-most-recent-
decisions-on-the-issue/.
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tions of the same patent in two separate countries.138 The UPC’s single ap-
peals court and the first division’s ability to rule on all designations of Eu-
ropean Patents will likely greatly diminish this problem.139 This will not be a 
cure-all, however. For instance, in the U.S., a jurisdiction with effectively a 
single appeals court for almost all patent cases, circuit splits remain.140 Simi-
larly, the UPC’s appeals court caseload and the expense of appealing cases 
may limit the court’s effectiveness at unifying decisions, leading to results 
analogous to the U.S.’s circuit splits.
Despite this potential shortcoming, the UPC does explicitly eliminate 
the possibility of an “Italian torpedo.” In particular, two provisions will es-
sentially abolish forum shopping with declaratory judgments. First, all de-
claratory judgment actions must be brought before the central division under 
the UPC.141 Second, the central division must stay those declaratory judg-
ment actions if the patent holder files an infringement suit within three 
months of the filing of the declaratory action.142 Thus, would-be defendants 
will no longer be able to kill cases simply by filing a declaratory judgment 
action first. Therefore, the creation of a single court system with a single 
appeals court and the elimination of the “Italian torpedo” will likely greatly 
diminish the incentive to forum shop within the UPC.
Compared to the U.S. system, the UPC’s lack of a jury trial may lead to 
comparatively less forum shopping. But the European system generally al-
ready rejects jury trials for patent cases, and the availability of jury trials in 
the U.S. may have limited effects on forum shopping. Some U.S. commen-
tators attribute plaintiffs’ strong preference for the Eastern District of Texas 
to that District’s jury pool and the District’s willingness to grant jury trials 
in patent cases.143 Others doubt this theory, suggesting that other factors 
drive forum selection rather than the “myth” of the preferable East Texas 
jury.144 Consequently, the lack of a jury trial may have little to do with fo-
rum shopping, and the UPC maintains the European status quo anyway.
But one change in the UPC that mirrors recent changes in the U.S. may 
actually promote forum shopping: giving courts discretion to bifurcate inva-
lidity and infringement. As discussed earlier, the U.S.’s recent adoption of 
inter partes review proceedings has created a large incentive for defendants
to forum shop. Defendants can, and frequently do, stay district court pro-
ceedings to invalidate the patent at issue before the USPTO, often with 
138. See Mejer, supra note 115, at 224–25; Walter Holzer, EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS 
FOR CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF PATENTS 6, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/presentations/scp_of_ge_06_holzer.pdf.
139. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art 9.
140. Macedo & Hudak, supra note 105.
141. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 33(4).
142. Id. at art. 33(6).
143. See, e.g., Blackman et al., supra note 120.
144. See Iancu & Chung, supra note 14, at 300.
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greater success than in district court.145 The UPC envisions a similar system 
in which local divisions—roughly analogous to U.S. district courts—can 
choose to hear invalidity issues or transfer them to a central division.146 In 
the U.S., slightly different “caselaw” has developed within the USPTO and 
within the district court system, leading many defendants to prefer the 
USPTO.147 A similar situation may unfold under the UPC if cases at the cen-
tral division start to diverge from those at local divisions. This will create a 
system where plaintiffs choose local divisions that are less likely to transfer 
invalidity issues and may incentivize defendants to push hard for transfers 
of invalidity decisions. Like in the U.S., this will increase litigation costs 
and may lead to divergent outcomes in similar cases heard in separate fo-
rums.
Thus, the UPC will likely reduce the motivation to forum shop due to 
its unified appeals court, continued prohibition on jury trials, and elimina-
tion of “torpedo” declaratory judgment actions, but allowing local divisions 
to decide whether to bifurcate invalidity and infringement actions will likely 
create a huge incentive to forum shop. Perhaps the contracting members 
should rethink their permissive attitude toward bifurcation. Instead, the UPC 
could either force local divisions to hear infringement and invalidity issues 
together or transfer all invalidity issues to the central division. Giving local 
divisions the discretion to split up these cases, however, represents a middle 
ground that will engender more forum shopping than either extreme would. 
Thus, bifurcation itself does not promote forum shopping, but wide judicial 
discretion does. With these lessons from the U.S. experience in mind, the 
UPC can limit the motivation to forum shop for venues with more favorable 
procedural rules.
3. Different Levels of Expertise and Local Patent Rules
The popular and legal press often overlook courts’ expertise as a moti-
vating factor for plaintiffs’ choice of venue, but expertise may be the most 
dominant factor that shapes plaintiffs’ choices in U.S. and European patent 
cases. Patent cases are among the most difficult cases to try. Judges have to 
grapple with not only complicated and constantly-evolving legal doctrines 
but also the highly sophisticated engineering and scientific knowledge nec-
essary to understand most modern patents. Consequently, litigants seek le-
gally and technically qualified judges for their cases. More competent judg-
es can speed up the resolution of a dispute and lower uncertainty for the 
litigants. Thus, patent expertise likely is a critical but oft-overlooked expla-
nation behind the popularity of certain fora. And litigants also seek fora 
145. See Vermont, supra note 18.
146. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 33(3).
147. See Flibbert & Queler, supra note 125.
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with clear timetables for litigation and codified local patent rules, enhancing 
the predictability of a case for both parties.
a.  The U.S. System
A few empirical observations strongly suggest that a court’s patent ex-
pertise, both technically and legally, significantly influences plaintiffs’ fo-
rum selection. The history of the Eastern District of Texas illustrates this 
point. The Eastern District of Texas was not always nearly as popular as it is 
today: in the late 1990’s, the district was not even in the top ten patent dis-
tricts nationwide.148 And other districts remain relatively popular even 
though they seem to lack “plaintiff friendly” jury pools. The Eastern District 
of Texas, the District of Delaware, the Central District of California, the 
Northern District of Illinois, and the Northern District of California rounded 
out the top five patent fora in 2016.149 Three of these districts have local 
rules specific to patent cases.150 And all five, except for the District of Del-
aware, participate in the USPTO’s patent pilot program for assigning patent 
cases to capable judges willing to oversee such cases.151 Only thirteen dis-
tricts across the country participate in that program.152 Local patent rules ex-
pedite cases and create a predictable discovery schedule for litigants. More-
over, litigating in a court participating in the patent pilot program likely 
increases the odds that one’s judge will engage with the case more closely. 
And designated judges in the patent pilot program resolve cases thirty days 
faster on average.153 So, unsurprisingly, the top five patent forums in the 
U.S. have demonstrated a commitment to making patent cases more effi-
cient either through local patent rules or participation in the USPTO’s patent 
pilot program. Thus a court’s expertise in patent law seems to play a large 
role in the popularity of courts in the U.S.
b. The Current European System
Judicial expertise also likely explains plaintiffs’ overwhelming prefer-
ence for Germany for European patent litigation. Germany heard almost 
seventy percent of all patent cases in Europe’s four primary patent jurisdic-
148. See Iancu & Chung, supra note 14, at 299 n.58.
149. Pedram Sameni, Patexia Chart 6: Top 10 Venues for Patent Litigation, PATEXIA
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.patexia.com/feed/weekly-chart-top-10-venues-for-patent-
litigation-20160809.
150. Travis Jensen, Local Patent Rules Adoption Dates, LOCAL PAT. RULES (Aug. 25, 
2017), http://www.localpatentrules.com/adoption-dates/.
151. Margaret S. Williams et al., Designated Judges, FED. JUD. CTR. PAT. PILOT 
PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/
2016/Patent%20Pilot%20Program%20Five-Year%20Report%20(2016).pdf.
152. Id. at 9.
153. See id. at 22 tbl.16.
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tions between 2000 and 2008.154 And the Dusseldorf court—Germany’s
Eastern District of Texas—heard almost forty percent of all patent cases in 
those jurisdictions during that time period.155 German regional courts have 
specialist panels of patent judges to oversee patent cases.156 Moreover, Ger-
many requires bifurcation of invalidity and infringement decisions: a spe-
cialized federal patent court oversees all trial-level invalidity decisions 
while the specialized panels at the regional courts hear all infringement cas-
es.157 This highly specialized and predictable system for patent cases likely 
explains much of the preference for German courts in Europe.
c.  The UPC and Suggested Changes
The UPC, like the current German system, highly prioritizes the legal 
and technical competence of its judges. Judges of all local divisions must be 
“legally qualified” for patent cases.158 Moreover, at the request of one of the 
parties, the UPC will appoint an additional judge qualified in the technical 
field pertaining to the patent in that case.159 These two provisions should 
greatly reduce the motivation to forum shop because expertise should be 
evenly distributed across local divisions. Moreover, judges from the central 
pool of judges may be imported for a case at the request of a single party. 
Therefore, plaintiffs have less incentive to choose a particular local division 
for a particular panel of judges when the defendant can later alter the com-
position of the panel of judges once hearings commence.
The UPC’s emphasis on judicial competence should not only reduce fo-
rum shopping but also increase judicial efficiency. The U.S. system’s more 
limited focus on judicial competence for patent cases, on the other hand, has 
increased the costs of patent litigation and heightened uncertainty in these 
cases. The Federal Circuit’s high reversal rates of lower district court’s de-
cisions illustrate this problem. Fifty percent of Section 101 (subject matter 
eligibility) rulings are reversed; 71 percent of Section 102 (anticipation) rul-
ings are reversed; and 31 percent of Section 103 (obviousness) rulings are 
reversed.160 On the other hand, the technically qualified administrative judg-
es at the USPTO are reversed less frequently. In those cases, 38 percent of 
Section 102 (anticipation) rulings are reversed; and 29 percent of Section 
154. Cremers et al., supra note 19, at 23.
155. Katrin Cremers et al., Patent Litigation in Europe 43 (Ctr. for European Econ. Re-
search, Discussion Paper No. 13-072, 2013), http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13072.pdf.
156. Kellenter & Midgal, supra note 27, at 5.
157. Id.
158. UPC Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8(2)–8(3).
159. Id. at art. 8(5).
160. Mark A. Perry & Michael Sitzman, Federal Circuit Year in Review 2015/2016,
GIBSON DUNN 1, 13 (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/
documents/publications/Federal-Circuit-2015-2016-Year-in-Review.pdf?utm_source=
IA&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=alert.
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103 (obviousness) rulings are reversed.161 Thus, these more legally and 
technically qualified judges are overruled significantly less frequently on at 
least one issue—anticipation/novelty.
Fostering a system with more uniformly qualified judges not only re-
duces forum shopping by leveling the playing field but also increases judi-
cial efficiency by reducing the need for appeals. And the UPC appears to be 
on the right track. The UPC requires legal qualification in patent law for all 
of its judges and creates a pool of technically qualified judges for cases re-
quiring such expertise. These uniformly qualified courts will reduce forum 
shopping and likely reduce the likelihood of a backlogged appeals docket.
III.  Conclusion
Proponents of the proposed Unified Patent Court seek to unify Europe-
an patent litigation under a single umbrella of courts. One of the key aims of 
this project is to reduce forum shopping in patent cases across Europe. Both 
the United States and the current European system have dealt extensively 
with this issue, providing valuable lessons for the UPC and its proponents. 
The UPC, as currently imagined, will significantly increase the opportunity 
to forum shop by relaxing current jurisdictional rules and effectively elimi-
nating the territorial boundaries of patent courts. But the UPC makes signif-
icant strides toward reducing the motivation to forum shop, primarily by re-
quiring uniformly expert judges and unifying procedural law across the 
courts. These findings are summarized in the table below.
161. Id. at 14.
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System: United States Current European 
System
Unified Patent Court 
(proposed)
Opportunity to 
forum shop: rules 
on jurisdiction 
and venue
Status: strongly 
permissive 
jurisdictional rules but 
moderately 
permissive venue 
rules after TC 
Heartland.
Effect: high but 
decreasing
opportunity to forum 
shop.
Status: moderately 
permissive
jurisdiction rules 
tempered by (1) 
territoriality of 
invalidity and (2) the 
Shevill doctrine.
Effect: moderate 
opportunity to forum 
shop.
Status: very strongly 
permissive
jurisdictional rules due 
to elimination of 
Shevill, expansive 
joinder rules for 
jurisdiction, and 
elimination of 
territorial limits on 
jurisdiction over 
remedies.
Effect: very high
opportunity to forum 
shop.
Motivation #1: 
do courts apply 
different 
substantive 
patent law? 
Status: slight 
difference among 
district courts and 
moderate difference
between district court 
and USPTO 
proceedings.
Effect: moderate 
incentive to forum 
shop, particularly for 
USPTO proceedings.
Status:
slight/moderate 
difference (different 
national laws).
Effect: slight 
motivation to forum 
shop.
Status: likely slight 
difference across 
different divisions.
Effect: slight/minimal 
motivation to forum 
shop.
Motivation #2: 
do courts apply 
different 
procedural laws?
Status: moderate 
difference among 
district courts and 
moderate/significant 
difference between 
district court and 
USPTO proceedings.
Effect:
moderate/significant
motivation to forum 
shop.
Status: significant 
differences, particular 
for available remedies.
Effect: significant
motivation to forum 
shop.
Status: slight/minimal
differences in 
procedural rules and 
single appeals court
Effect: minimal (and 
greatly diminished) 
motivation to forum 
shop.
Motivation #3: 
varying expertise 
of judges and 
predictability of 
proceedings
Status: significant 
differences among 
district courts.
significant difference 
between district court 
and USPTO 
proceedings.
Effect: significant 
motivation to forum 
shop.
Status: significant 
differences (German 
courts dominate 
primarily for this 
reason.)
Effect: 
significant/very 
significant motivation 
to forum shop.
Status: minimal 
variance in judicial 
competence or local 
rules.
Effect: minimal (and 
greatly diminished) 
motivation to forum 
shop.
Thus, the UPC’s effects on forum shopping will be mixed: the UPC re-
duces motivation but increases opportunity. Only time will tell whether liti-
gants will exercise their increased opportunity to forum shop, considering 
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the benefits will decrease. But several small changes can reduce this likeli-
hood even further. The UPC should tighten its jurisdictional rules, impose 
stricter rules concerning bifurcation of invalidity and infringement, and, at 
an appropriate time down the road, further unify substantive patent law. 
With these changes, the UPC will better achieve its aim of reducing forum 
shopping.
